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Self-Fulfilling Liquidity Dry-Ups
FREDERIC MALHERBE∗
ABSTRACT
I analyze a model in which holding cash imposes a negative externality: it worsens
future adverse selection in markets for long-term assets, which impairs their role
for liquidity provision. Adverse selection worsens when potential sellers of long-term
assets hold more cash because then fewer sales reflect cash needs, and proportionally
more sales reflect private information. Moreover, future market illiquidity makes
current cash holding more appealing. This feedback effect may result in hoarding
behavior and a market breakdown, which I interpret as a self-fulfilling liquidity
dry-up. This mechanism suggests that imposing liquidity requirements on financial
institutions may backfire.
A NUMBER OF POLICY makers and academics have pointed out unusual cash
hoarding behavior by major financial institutions since the 2007 to 2009 fi-
nancial crisis in general and a further surge in the euro area since the end
of 2011.1 Many have also expressed concerns that such behavior worsens eco-
nomic outcomes,2 a topic to which several recent academic studies have been
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dedicated (Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), Acharya and Skeie (2011),
Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2011), Diamond and Rajan (2012), Gale and
Yorulmazer (2012)). The role of adverse selection during the crisis has also been
highlighted (see, for instance, Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2011), Morris
and Shin (2012), and Tirole (2012)). However, the possibility that hoarding
behavior and adverse selection may reinforce each other has received little
attention so far.
Secondary markets are a source of liquidity provision for owners of long-term
assets. Financial markets in which agents sell existing assets or issue claims
to their payoffs are a good example. However, information asymmetry may
result in adverse selection, which impairs market functioning and prevents
gains from trade from being realized (Akerlof (1970)). Thus, adverse selection
in these markets undermines their role in liquidity provision (Eisfeldt (2004)).
This paper develops such an adverse selection model of liquidity in which
cash holding by some agents imposes a negative externality on others because
it reduces future market liquidity. The intuition for why holding cash worsens
adverse selection is best understood from a buyer’s point of view: the more
cash a seller is expected to have on hand, the less likely it is that he is trading
because of a need to raise cash, and the more likely it is that he is trying to
pass on a lemon.
The agents I study in the model make an investment decision. They can be
thought of as entrepreneurs undertaking real projects or as banks issuing long-
term loans. At an initial date, each agent allocates his funds between a long-
term risky asset and a riskless short-term asset (which represents cash). There
is a return-liquidity trade-off because long-term assets have a higher expected
return, but agents need some cash before they pay off. At an interim date, they
privately observe the idiosyncratic quality of their asset before they can trade
in a competitive market. Because of information asymmetry, the market price
is affected by the market’s perceived motive for trading: either a need for cash
or the private knowledge that the asset is a lemon. The model delivers Pareto-
ranked multiple equilibria, which provides a striking illustration of how the
externality operates.
In a first equilibrium, agents hoard enough cash that they do not need to
participate in the interim market. This is well understood by the potential
buyers, who infer that good assets will not be for sale. Therefore, assets can
only trade at the lemons price. Hence, the interim market breaks down, it
is illiquid, and no gains from trade are realized. Market illiquidity, in turn,
justifies the initial hoarding decision.
In contrast, if agents decide to be fully invested in the long-term asset, they
need to participate in the interim market to satisfy their cash needs. This is
true irrespective of their asset quality and therefore some good assets will be for
sale too. Volume and price improve and so does market liquidity. If the mixture
of assets is good enough, the market price can be high enough that selling an
press release on October 28, 2008; and “Banks need to realise that hoarding cash is not the answer,”
Financial Times, August 17, 2008, for an example in the press.
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asset yields a positive return. In that case, holding cash is dominated, which
justifies the initial decision to be fully invested in the long-term asset.
The key mechanism is as follows: when agents decide to hold cash, the ex-
pected quality of their future sales decreases. This depresses the market price,
which imposes an externality on other agents. Moreover, the lower the expected
market price, the more appealing it is to hold cash. Thus, holding cash presents
strategic complementarities. This may result in widespread hoarding behavior,
which in turn causes the market to break down.
These results contrast with the common view that exposure to liquidity risk
creates a negative externality (Acharya, Krishnamurthy, and Perotti (2011),
Perotti and Suarez (2011)) and therefore financial institutions tend to hold too
little liquidity. Indeed, excess reliance on short-term debt or excessive maturity
mismatch can result in fire sales, a mechanism that has been pinpointed as a
major magnifying factor of the recent financial crisis (Brunnermeier (2009),
Krishnamurthy (2010)). Accordingly, new regulation will increase liquidity re-
quirements for financial institutions (this is explicitly mentioned in the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision’s recommendation (Basel Committee on
Bank Supervision (2011)) and in the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States).
An implication of my model is that, while an appropriate regulatory response
to fire sale externalities, such policies are likely to have adverse unintended
consequences when trades reflect private information: a liquidity requirement
(such as the liquidity coverage ratio envisioned by Basel III) reduces the future
need to raise cash and thus deters market participation for this motive, which
impairs market liquidity. In fact, it may even cause a dry-up.
Another implication concerns the design of public intervention should a crisis
occur. In the model, the promise of future public intervention ensures efficiency
because it makes hoarding unattractive and prevents a self-fulfilling liquidity
dry-up. However, once agents have decided to hoard, it is “too late” and public
intervention cannot restore efficiency. The key policy insights here are the
following: First, participation constraints, not only participation in the market
but also in public schemes (such as the asset buyback initially envisioned
in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), depend on hoarding decisions.
Hoarding behavior may thus affect the efficiency of public intervention. Second,
flooding financial institutions with liquidity to foster new investment (which
major central banks have arguably done recently) may exacerbate adverse
selection in markets for legacy assets.
The paper belongs to the body of adverse selection models of market liquidity
that build on Akerlof (1970). In particular, Eisfeldt (2004) develops the endoge-
nous liquidity framework on which I build. She shows that higher productivity
in the economy improves asset market liquidity because it increases invest-
ment, which makes income more risky. This makes agents more eager to share
risk in the secondary market, which increases potential gains from trade and
improves market liquidity. In my paper, risk-sharing does not drive asset sales
since all uncertainty is resolved before the market opens. Other papers that
study interactions between productivity and adverse selection in asset markets
include Kurlat (2012) and Bigio (2011).
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The paper is closely related to Plantin (2009), who presents a model where
investment decisions depend on liquidity anticipation, and information is as-
sumed to bemore symmetric whenmany investors invest in the long-term risky
asset. In Chari, Shourideh, and Zetlin-Jones (2011), another relevant paper,
current selling decisions reveal information, that affects future adverse selec-
tion. In contrast to these two papers, in my setup adverse selection is affected
by sellers’ past investment decisions because they affect their current marginal
rate of intertemporal substitution.
The paper shares with Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2011) and Heider,
Hoerova, and Holthausen (2010) the result that the fear of future illiquidity
may trigger hoarding behavior. However, it differs on the effects that ex ante
hoarding has on future market conditions. In particular, their models do not
capture the negative externality I present here, but they do have cash-in-the-
market-pricing effects, which they combine with adverse selection.
The cash-in-the-market-pricing literature builds on the general idea of an
inelastic demand for financial assets. Focusing on other financial frictions, it
yields quite opposite results from my model: investment decisions are typically
strategic substitutes and holding liquidity usually imposes a positive external-
ity. It is thus worth explaining the main mechanisms at play.
A cash-in-the-market-pricing episode is a case in which potential buyers do
not have enough cash to clear the market at the “fundamental” value (Allen
and Gale (1994), Allen and Carletti (2008)).3 In that case, sellers can only
obtain a fire sale price for their assets.4 Therefore, when an agent decides to
hold more cash ex ante, this increases the market price ex post, which reduces
the incentive to hold cash for others. Investment decisions are thus strategic
substitutes.
When cash-in-the-market-pricing is combined with another friction, for in-
stance, a credit constraint due to moral hazard concerns (Hart and Moore
(1994), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999)), a collapse in prices may force agents to deleverage, which depresses
prices further. When this effect is not internalized the competitive equilibrium
is generally inefficient (Caballero andKrishnamurthy (2003), Lorenzoni (2008),
Korinek (2011), Stein (2012)). In that case, holding liquidity has positive exter-
nalities and private agents tend to hold too little of it. Liquidity requirements
or limits to maturity mismatch can therefore be socially beneficial. Whether
the competitive equilibrium may imply socially excessive or insufficient hold-
ing of liquidity thus depends on the nature of the underlying friction (adverse
3 The cash-in-the-market-pricing mechanism, or variations thereof, has been widely used to
study liquidity dry-ups and related events (see, for instance, Diamond and Rajan (2011) and Gale
and Yorulmazer (2012)). In the market microstructure literature, similar effects are obtained ei-
ther with an exogenously downward-sloping demand for assets and arbitrageurs that face resource
constraints that are functions of the market price (Gennotte and Leland (1990), Morris and Shin
(2004)), or with limits-of-arbitrage constraints (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), which create an en-
dogenously inelastic supply of interim liquidity (Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009)).
4 See Shleifer and Vishny (2011) for a survey on fire sales.
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selection or moral hazard, respectively). Which friction is most relevant in re-
ality may vary over time and is an empirical question. I discuss the model’s
empirical predictions in Section III but their testing is beyond the scope of this
paper.
Finally, other relevant work includes Perotti and Suarez (2011), Farhi and
Tirole (2012), and Stein (2012) on liquidity regulation; Tirole (2012), Philippon
and Skreta (2012), Chari, Shourideh, and Zetlin-Jones (2011), Chiu and Koeppl
(2010), Guerrieri and Shimer (2012), and House and Masatlioglu (2012) on the
design of public intervention in markets plagued by adverse selection; and,
more generally, Brunnermeier (2009), for a chronology of the recent crisis and
Tirole (2011) for a survey on the economics of liquidity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I outlines the model. Section II
solves the model and shows that it may admit multiple equilibria. Section III
discusses the externality, considers the effects of liquidity requirements and
public liquidity insurance, presents the empirical predictions, and highlights
the key features of the model. Section IV concludes.
I. The Model
The model has three dates (t = 0,1,2) with a unique consumption good that
is also the unit of account. The key elements of the timeline are as follows: at
date 0, agents make an investment decision. At date 1, they privately learn
information before they trade in a competitive market and choose how much
they consume at that date. At date 2, investments pay off and final consumption
takes place.
A. Agents, Technology, and Information
Let there be a measure one of ex ante (at t = 0) identical agents who are
initially endowed with one unit of the consumption good and maximize
E[ln c1 + ln c2],
where ct is their consumption at date t.
At dates 0 and 1, they have access to a risk-free one-period storage technology
that represents cash; it yields a zero rate of return. At date 0, they also have
access to a risky long-term technology that consists of projects, undertaken
at date 0, that only pay off at date 2. These projects succeed with probability
π < 1. In the case of success, the projects yield a return RH per unit invested.
In the case of failure, the return is RL, with 0 ≤ RL < RH . I assume RL <
1 < πRH + (1 − π )RL: on average, long-term projects are more productive than
storage, but they yield less than storage in the case of failure. Investment
decisions are not observable.
At the beginning of date 1, agents privately observe their projects’ quality,
that is, whether the projects are going to succeed or fail. Quality is common to
all the projects of a given agent. One can thus think of each agent as owning only
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one project of variable size. However, quality is independent across agents and,
assuming a law of large numbers, average quality is deterministic. If projects
are stopped at date 1, they yield nothing. However, at that date, agents may
issue claims to the payoff of their projects in a competitive market, which I
describe later.
Let there also be a measure one of risk-neutral “deep-pocket” buyers (the
term agent refers exclusively to the ones described earlier). Their existence
ensures that the market clears at the expected value of the underlying payoffs.
To prevent agents from circumventing date-1market incompleteness by trad-
ing at date 0 (i.e, before they are privately informed), I rule this possibility out
by assuming that agents are needed to initiate their own projects and that they
cannot commit to properly invest on behalf of a date-0 buyer.5
B. Interim Market
I consider a competitive market in which agents trade perfectly divisible
shares of their projects. The market opens at date 1. There is no other means
to borrow against future income than to issue shares of ongoing projects, and
issuance is limited to existing projects. Short sales are thus ruled out. In line
with most of the literature, I assume that all trades take place at the same
price.6 It would be a natural outcome of an anonymous market in which buyers
cannot infer quality from quantities because sellers can split their sales.
Henceforth, I call shares of high-quality projects “good assets,” and shares of
low-quality projects “bad assets” or lemons interchangeably.
C. Demand for Shares and Market Price
Buyers do not have access to the long-term technology. They only have access
to storage and to the interim market. I assume that they have, on aggregate,
enough resources available at date 1 to clear the market at the expected value
of the underlying payoffs.
When asset quality is private information, the expected value of an asset
depends on the average quality of traded assets (Akerlof (1970)). Therefore,
the market unit price p is given by
p(q) = RL + q(RH − RL), (1)
where q, which is inferred by the buyers at equilibrium, denotes the proportion
of good assets in the market.
5 A way to justify this would be that proper project initiation is not verifiable and not observable
before date 1 and improper initiation makes the project fail for sure but provides investors with a
private benefit.
6 This is assumed, for instance, in Akerlof (1970), Eisfeldt (2004), Bolton, Santos, and
Scheinkman (2011), and Chari, Shourideh, and Zetlin-Jones (2011). However, when it is assumed
that buyers quote prices, assets of different qualities can trade at different prices. This is the case,
for instance, in Wilson (1980), and more recently in Guerrieri and Shimer (2012).
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D. Market Liquidity
A unit invested in the long-term asset, and then sold, yields p units of con-
sumption goods at date 1. The interim market is thus a source of liquidity
provision, and, the higher the price, the better the liquidity provision. Equa-
tion (1) states that p increases with q. Therefore, adverse selection undermines
liquidity provision: the more severe the adverse selection (the lower the q), the
poorer the liquidity provision by the market.
Since the alternative way to obtain consumption goods at date 1 is holding
cash, it is convenient to use the following definition:
DEFINITION 1 (Illiquid market): The market is said to be illiquid if p < 1. This
happens when q < 1−RLRH−RL .
II. Equilibria
In this section, I show that the model may deliver multiple rational expecta-
tions equilibria, one of them being a self-fulfilling liquidity dry-up.
A. The Problem of the Agent
From a date-0 perspective, agents need to choose how much of their initial
endowment to invest in the long-term technology. The variable y ∈ [0,1] cap-
tures this initial investment decision. Agents also have to make contingent
consumption plans for the subsequent dates. Letting the index i ∈ {L, H} re-
flect variable state contingency (i.e., the realization of Ri for the agent), they
have to choose how much of the long-term asset to sell (xi) at date 1 at the
market price (p), and how much to store (si) until date 2.
Formally, agents seek to maximize
E[ln(c1i) + ln(c2i)],
subject to the contingent budget constraints
{
c1i = 1 − y + pxi − si
c2i = (y− xi)Ri + si, (2)
and the boundary conditions si ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ xi ≤ y.
The budget constraints state the following: date-1 resources consist of storage
fromdate 0, plus the revenue fromasset sales. These resources can be consumed
or stored until date 2. At date 2, resources available for consumption consist of
the output from the share of long-term investment that has not been sold, plus
storage from date 1.
In the following paragraphs, I solve this problem by backward induction.
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B. Contingent Optimal Sale of Long-Term Assets (Date 1)
The realization of Ri is learned at the beginning of the period, y is prede-
termined, and p is taken as given. At date 1, agents therefore face a simple
intertemporal consumption problem: maximize ln(c1i) + ln(c2i), subject to the
pair of realized budget constraints (2).
First, let me consider the agents with low-quality assets, whom I call agents
L. If p > RL, they obviously sell all their assets. For simplicity, I assume that
they do the same when p = RL, and I restrict the analysis to prices that are
consistent with equation (1): p ∈ [RL, RH]. Accordingly, letting xi(p, y) denote
agents i’s optimal asset sale for a given pair (p, y), I have
xL(p, y) = y . (3)
To equate their marginal utility of consumption over time, agents then set
sL(p, y) so as to split their resource equally across the two dates. Hence, their
optimal consumption plan given (p, y) is
c1L(p, y) = c2L(p, y) = 1 − y + py2 . (4)
Let me now turn to agents H. First, observe that equation (3) implies that
p < RH . Therefore, it is not optimal to have both xH > 0 and sH > 0. It follows
that the first-order conditions yield
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
xH(p, y) = max
{
0;
py − 1 + y
2p
}
sH(p, y) = max
{
0;
1 − y − yRH
2
}
,
(5)
which determines their optimal consumption plan given (p, y). A simple deriva-
tion of xH(p, y) establishes the following:
LEMMA 1 (Market participation): xH(p, y), the quantity of assets sold by agents
H, increases with y and strictly increases if y ≥ 11+p.
The polar cases convey the main intuition. If y ≤ 11+p , agents H have enough
cash to avoid selling their good assets at a discount. If y = 1, they have no
cash, and participating in the market is their only means to obtain current
consumption goods. They therefore sell some assets (in particular, given that
utility is logarithmic, they sell half of them). Essentially, the less cash they
have at hand, the more they need to sell assets. This first result is important
because it establishes the channel through which initial investment decisions
affect the mixture of assets that will be traded at date 1.
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C. Optimal Investment Decision (Date 0)
Let me define Ui(p, y) ≡ ln c1i(p, y) + ln c2i(p, y), the state-contingent level
of utility achieved in state i for a given pair (p, y). Then the optimal date-0
investment policy given p corresponds to:
y(p) ≡ argmax
y
π UH(p, y) + (1 − π )UL(p, y) .
PROPOSITION 1 (Optimal investment):
y(p) ∈
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
[
0, 12
[
; p < 1[ 1
2 ,1
]
; p = 1
{1} ; p > 1 .
Sketch of the proof (see Appendix A for a complete proof): For p < 1, con-
sidering the marginal utility of y separately in the two states provides the
most intuitive proof that the optimal y is strictly smaller than 12 . First, in
state L, consumption at both dates is 1−y+py2 , and the marginal utility of y is
therefore strictly negative. Second, in state H, while a strictly positive y is
desirable because the asset yields a high payoff if held to maturity, it is more
efficient to provide for date-1 consumption through storage rather than selling
the long-term asset (since p < 1). This implies that maximizing UH(p, y) boils
down to maximizing ln (1 − y) + ln (yRH), which is strictly concave in y, and
reaches a maximum at y = 12 . Summing up, when p < 1, the marginal utility
of y is strictly negative in state L and can only be strictly positive for y < 12 in
state H. Therefore, expected utility maximization implies that the optimal y be
strictly smaller than 12 . When p > 1, investment dominates storage irrespective
of realized quality, and y = 1 is always optimal.
D. Implied Asset Sales
I can now evaluate the state-contingent asset sale functions (3) and (5) at the
optimal investment level given by Proposition 1:
xL(p, y(p)) = y ;
xH(p, y(p)) ∈
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
{0} ; p < 1{ 1
2
}
; p > 1[
0, 12
]
; p = 1 .
(6)
DEFINITION 2 (Hoarding): Agents are said to be hoarding when they decide to
fully cover date-1 consumption needs with cash holdings, rather than relying
on market liquidity provision. That is, when c1i ≤ 1 − y, for i = L, H.
PROPOSITION 2 (Hoarding): The anticipation of an illiquid market (p < 1) leads
to hoarding.
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Proof: First, from equation (6), p < 1 implies that xH = 0, and therefore
c1H ≤ 1 − y. Second, from Proposition 1, p < 1 implies y(p) < 12 , which implies
1−y(p)+py(p)
2 < 1 − y(p). Since the left-hand term corresponds to c1L(p, y) (equa-
tion (4)), this establishes the result. Q.E.D.
E. Average Quality
Assuming a law of large numbers, I can now define and compute q(p, y(p)),
the proportion of good assets for a given p, at the investment level y, which is
itself consistent with p:
q(p, y(p)) ≡ πxH
(
p, y(p)
)
(1 − π )xL
(
p, y(p)
)+ πxH (p, y(p)) ∈
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
{0} ; p < 1{
π
2−π
}
; p > 1[
0, π2−π
]
; p = 1 .
(7)
F. Equilibrium Definition
A triple (y∗,q∗, p∗) is a rational expectations equilibrium for this economy if
and only if:
(i) y∗ is an optimal investment decision given p∗;
(ii) q∗ is the proportion of good assets in the market implied by a price p∗
when the initial investment decision was y∗;
(iii) p∗ = RL + q∗(RH − RL), that is, p∗ is the expected asset payoff given q∗.
G. Equilibria
To find the equilibria of this economy, I combine the buyers’ no-arbitrage
condition (1) with equation (7) to define the implied price correspondence:
p
′
(p) ≡ RL + q(p, y(p))[RH − RL], (8)
where p
′
(p) is the market price corresponding to a proportion of good assets
q(p, y(p)). Therefore, when y(p) is a singleton,7 a fixed point p
′
(p) = p pins
down an equilibrium for the economy. The corresponding values of y∗ and q∗
are then given by Proposition 1 and equation (7), respectively.8
H. Example of a Self-Fulfilling Liquidity Dry-Up
Figure 1 illustrates that, in this economy, the same fundamentals (π, RH, RL)
might lead to multiple equilibria that differ by their level of market liquidity.
In a first equilibrium (Eliq), agents expect the market to be liquid (p > 1).
Accordingly, they invest only in the long-term asset. Given that they have
7 This is true in the interesting cases, that is, when p 	= 1.
8 Defined over [RL, RH ], the correspondence p
′
(p) is nonempty, convex, and has a closed graph.
The existence of a fixed point is thus guaranteed by Kakutani’s theorem.
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Figure 1. Example of multiple equilibria. This picture depicts the implied price correspon-
dence (expression (8)) with parameter values π = 0.5, RH = 2, and RL = 0.8. Equilibria of themodel
are given by fixed points of the correspondence, which are at its intersection with the identity line
p
′ = p.
no cash, agents H need to participate in the market to provide for current
consumption. This sustains a relatively high average quality (q∗ = 1/3) and
ensures market liquidity (p∗ = 1.2). However, if agents anticipate an illiquid
market (p < 1), they initially choose to hoard. Accordingly, agents H do not
need to sell their assets, and the market breaks down: only lemons are for
sale (q∗ = 0). The market is thus illiquid (p∗ = RL), which justifies the initial
hoarding decision. Equilibrium Eilliq is thus a self-fulfilling liquidity dry-up.
Both equilibria are locally stable in the sense that best responses to any small
perturbation to the equilibrium price would bring the price back to equilibrium.
There are also equilibria corresponding to p = 1, but they are unstable.9
I have assumed that agents L sell all their lemons when p = RL. Without this
assumption, the quantity they sell in the low-liquidity equilibrium is indeter-
minate (it is given by xL ∈ [0, y]), but the equilibrium allocation of resources is
unchanged. This allocation is unique given the initial investment decision and,
since there are no gains from trade, it is equivalent to a market freeze (which,
strictly speaking, corresponds to xL = 0). Given initial investment decisions,
the high-liquidity equilibrium is also unique. It is a pooling equilibrium (in
prices, not in quantities) in the sense that agents L pretend they are of the H
type and get the same price, even though they sell larger quantities.10
The example depicted in Figure 1 is not an exception. In fact, a low-liquidity
equilibrium always exists, and, if the long-term asset is sufficiently productive,
9 There is a single symmetric equilibrium with p = 1, but since y(p) is not a singleton in that
case, there is also an infinity of asymmetric equilibria.
10 If quantity sold were observable, a high-liquidity pooling equilibrium (in price and quantity)
would exist under similar conditions. The analysis could be done on the basis of this equilibrium.
However, a separating equilibrium in which different types trade different (and strictly positive)
quantities at different prices might also exist.
958 The Journal of Finance R©
a high-liquidity equilibrium exists too. Formally, for each pair (π, RL), there is
a threshold for RH from which there are multiple equilibria.11
PROPOSITION 3 (Self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups): If RH ≥ (2−π)π − 2 (1−π)π RL, both
a low-liquidity equilibrium (i.e., with p∗ < 1) and a high-liquidity equilibrium
(i.e., with p∗ > 1) exist. The low-liquidity equilibrium can thus be interpreted
as a self-fulfilling liquidity dry-up.
Proof: Straightforward. Q.E.D.
III. Discussion
In this section, I first discuss the externality whose identification is the main
contribution of the paper. Second, I provide a concrete application, where I
show that imposing liquidity requirements on financial institutions (a policy
response to the recent financial crisis) may have unintended consequences.
Third, I explain how public liquidity insurance can prevent agents from coor-
dinating on the Pareto-dominated equilibrium of the model. I then highlight
the relevant contexts to which the results apply, and I discuss the novel empir-
ical predictions. Finally, I highlight the key ingredients required to obtain the
externality and relate them to the main assumptions of the model.
A. The Externality
At date 1, the “true” value of an asset is Ri ∈ {RL, RH} per unit. Hence, a
trade at a unit price of p 	= Ri implies a transfer of value from the seller to the
buyer (the transfer is negative if p > Ri). At equilibrium, the price adjusts so
that the buyers break even on expectation. Therefore, an increase in the sale
of good assets increases the market price, which is beneficial to other sellers.
This is the standard pecuniary externality linked to adverse selection.
Whether an agent with a good asset chooses to trade, and therefore provides
a positive externality, hinges on his private valuation of this asset being lower
than the market price. The key point in the model is that his private valuation
depends on his date-0 investment decision. The larger his position in the long-
term asset, the less cash he has on hand, and the more he needs to sell assets
to cover current needs. Formally, from Lemma 1, we have that xH (p, y), the
quantity of assets sold by type-H agents, is increasing in y. Consequently,
changes in y affect the expected quality of future sales.
The expected quality of an asset (the probability that it is a good one) sold by
an agent who faces a price p and has invested y is given by
qe(p, y) ≡ πxH (p, y)
(1 − π )xL (p, y) + πxH (p, y) .
11 Note that equilibrium multiplicity does not depend on the choice of the distribution of project
quality, on the return to storage, or on the specific form of the utility function. See the working
paper version of the model for a proof of equilibrium multiplicity under more general assumptions
(Malherbe (2010)).
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The numerator is his expected sales of good assets, and the denominator is
his expected total sales.12 A simple derivation establishes that ∂q
e(p,y)
∂y ≥ 0, with
strict inequality when y ≥ 11+p . An increase in y thus improves the expected
quality of future sales, which provides a nice intuition for how the externality
works. However, an increase in y also increases the quantity of lemons to be
sold. To establish the externality, one must look at the expected net effect.
Let me restrict the analysis to prices that are between the two equilibrium
prices (including them), and let me define t(p, y) as the expected transfer im-
plied by future sales of an agent that invests y in the long-term asset and faces
a price p, that is,
t(p, y) ≡ πxH(p, y)(RH − p) + (1 − π )xL(p, y)(RL − p) .
An increase in t(p, y) increases the market price, which implies a positive
externality. Similarly, a decrease in t(p, y) implies a negative externality.
PROPOSITION 4 (Externality): Provided that y is not already too low, the decision
to hold more cash (i.e., to decrease y) imposes a negative externality on other
agents. That is, ∂t(p,y)
∂y > 0, ∀y ∈
[
1
1+p,1
]
.
Proof: See Appendix A. Q.E.D.
Note that, when y ∈ [ 11+p,1], xH(p, y) is strictly increasing in y (Lemma 1).
The result is then obvious when p = RL, and it can be easily generalized to the
high-liquidity equilibrium price and to any price in between.
Given the externality, it is not surprising that the high-liquidity equilib-
rium Pareto dominates the low-liquidity one. This is because: (i) no resource
is wasted in the storage technology; (ii) agents H enjoy better consumption
smoothing (these are the direct gains from trade); and (iii) there is a cross-
subsidy from agents H to agents L, which is desirable from an ex ante insurance
perspective.
Note finally that the feedback effect that leads to equilibrium multiplicity
comes from strategic complementarities13 in initial investment decisions. To
see how these strategic complementarities work and how they are linked
to the externality, consider the range of actions analyzed in Proposition 4.
These actions decrease the market price. But a lower market price makes
the long-term asset less attractive (because a lower price decreases the option
value to sell at the interim date, without changing the cost of the investment)
and thus makes holding cash more attractive. These actions therefore present
strategic complementarities.14 This is another important difference with
12 In a symmetric equilibrium, qe(p, y) is equal to q(p, y(p)), the proportion of good assets in the
market.
13 In game theory, an action presents strategic complementarities if the incentive for an agent
to take this action increases when others take it.
14 Note, however, that strategic complementarities are not global: at a high initial level of cash
holdings, a further increase no longer decreases the price and can even increase it. See Appendix
B for further discussion.
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the cash-in-the-market-pricing literature, where cash-holding decisions are
typically strategic substitutes.
B. Liquidity Requirement
In reaction to the recent crisis, regulators seem determined to require that
financial institutions hold more liquidity (the Basel Committee on Banking Su-
pervision has recommended the imposition of a liquidity coverage ratio (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2011)), and the Dodd-Frank Act stipulates
that liquidity requirements should be taken into account for setting prudential
standards for systemically important financial institutions). While this is a
sensible thing to do to mitigate fire sale externalities, my results suggest that
such requirements may have adverse unintended consequences when trades
reflect private information.
I present here a very simple exercise that illustrates the above point. Specif-
ically, I consider a liquidity requirement imposed by a regulator on date-0
investment decisions:
1 − y ≥ ρ, (9)
which simply means that a fraction ρ of the initial endowment should be kept
in cash (i.e., should be stored).
The first implication is that it puts an upper bound on agents’ maturity
mismatch, which can only reduce their future needs to raise cash. Hence, it
deters market participation for this motive and makes adverse selection more
severe.
PROPOSITION 5 (Unintended consequences): A liquidity requirement strictly
reduces welfare at the high-liquidity equilibrium andmay even cause a liquidity
dry-up.
Proof: See Appendix A. Q.E.D.
First, observe that, in a high-liquidity equilibrium, the liquidity buffer re-
quirement (condition (9)) is binding: when the market is liquid, storage is
dominated and is kept at a minimum (y = 1 − ρ). By Lemma 1 (market par-
ticipation), setting an upper bound to y can only deter market participation of
agents H: at a given p, xH increases with y; it thus decreases with ρ. Average
quality at the high-liquidity equilibrium (assuming it still exists) is thus lower,
and so is the price. Both types of agents are ex post worse off because they
are forced to invest in a dominated technology, and this has no beneficial effect
since the interim market price is actually depressed. Second, because a higher
ρ deters market participation of agents H and depresses the price, there is,
for a given parameter set (RH,RL,π ), a ρ from which a market price greater
than or equal to one is not sustainable and market liquidity must dry up. In
other words, an increase in ρ shrinks the parameter region compatible with a
high-liquidity equilibrium.
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C. Coordination Failure and Public Liquidity Insurance
In this model, a self-fulfilling liquidity dry-up is a coordination failure: if
agents expect others to hoard, their best response is to hoard too, even though
they know that a high-liquidity equilibrium is possible.
In this simple setup, the coordination failure can, however, be easily pre-
vented with public intervention. For instance, the government can guarantee
at date 0 a date-1 floor price of one. In that case, cash becomes a dominated
asset, no one hoards, and the only possible outcome is the Pareto-preferred
equilibrium. This intervention can be interpreted as a public liquidity insur-
ance and is very similar in spirit to the demand deposit insurance in Diamond
and Dybvig (1983).
In more elaborate setups, however, the design of public intervention that
aims at overcoming adverse selection in financial markets is a complex issue.
One reason is that agents’ participation constraints depend on expected public
intervention (Philippon and Skreta (2012), Tirole (2012)). But my results sug-
gest an additional layer of complexity: market participation also depends on
cash positions, which themselves depend on expected public intervention. An
example is that the public liquidity insurance mentioned earlier would only
be effective if credibly announced ex ante. Once agents have decided to hoard,
guaranteeing a floor price is still feasible ex post, but it would no longer be
a Pareto improvement. Hoarding behavior may thus seriously impact the ef-
ficiency of public interventions such as those considered by Tirole (2012) and
Philippon and Skreta (2012). It would therefore be interesting to study this
question in a dynamic setup that allows for ex ante hoarding decisions.
D. Relevant Context and Empirical Predictions
The model applies to markets that may be subject to adverse selection on
the sellers’ side. For example, this can be the case for markets for financial
securities, such as common stocks or asset-backed securities, or for corporate
assets.15
The model first delivers empirical predictions related to the severity of ad-
verse selection in contexts where sellers’ “liquidity positions” are hard to assess
by outsiders. Thus, these predictions are more likely to apply when sellers are
large and complex companies with opaque balance sheets rather than small
companies operating a single line of business (see Tirole (2011) on the diffi-
culty of assessing liquidity positions). A worsening of adverse selection in a
given market is characterized by lower prices, lower volumes, and lower av-
erage quality of the assets that are traded (compared to those that are not)
and by higher incentives to invest in costly information acquisition about these
assets.
15 See, for instance, Downing, Jaffee, and Wallace (2009) for evidence of adverse selection in the
market for mortgage-backed securities, and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) for
evidence of adverse selection in equity issuance linked to corporate acquisition.
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PREDICTION 1: Adverse selection intensifies in periods of high cash holdings.
The unusual and widespread hoarding behavior that has been observed in
the aftermath of the recent financial crisis makes it an interesting context for
testing this prediction.16 A case in point could be asset-backed securities. While
their design is supposed to alleviate adverse selection (Demarzo and Duffie
(1999) and DeMarzo (2005)), these securities had largely become “toxic” in the
fall of 2008, a phenomenon widely associated with adverse selection (Morris
and Shin (2012), Tirole (2012)). However, the economy had also entered a re-
cession that was likely to be severe. Bad news about fundamentals increases
the information sensitivity of debt-like assets and makes them more prone to
adverse selection (Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m
(2012)). But this second channel is not incompatible with the cash holding one.
In fact, the two effects are likely to reinforce each other and would probably be
hard to disentangle during this period. Still, issuance in securitization markets
has, by and large, not recovered (Gorton and Metrick (2013)), while macroeco-
nomic fundamentals have arguably improved (at least in the United States).
This provides support for the economic significance of the cash-holding channel.
PREDICTION 2: When sellers’ cash needs decrease (increase), or when other
sources of cash become more (less) easily available to them, adverse selection
intensifies (abates).
This prediction relates directly to my discussion on liquidity requirements.
It applies, for instance, to markets in which financial institutions are natural
sellers/issuers. An example of changing refinancing conditions could be an in-
crease in the range of collateral eligible for borrowing at the central bank or a
change in the class of institutions that can access central bank lending. Such
changes have been made during the recent crisis to ease the short-term fund-
ing of financial institutions. The model suggests that they may actually have
worsened adverse selection in other markets (such as those for asset-backed se-
curities, for example). The same must be said of the European Central Bank’s
recent launch of long-term refinancing operations (LTRO), since it implies a
protracted period of easy refinancing for financial institutions in the euro area.
PREDICTION 3: Sellers of assets that are prone to adverse selection are relatively
more likely to release information on cash needs and to report reasons for selling
that are allegedly unrelated to the quality of the assets they sell.
Divesting firms often publicly announce that the assets they sell are “non-
core” (or “nonstrategic”) and/or that the divestiture is driven by cash needs.
Informing investors about corporate strategy could be the purpose of such
announcements, but it may also be an attempt to alleviate suspicions of an
16 Since August 2007, U.K. banks have substantially increased their liquidity buffers (Acharya
and Merrouche (2013)); since September 2008, there has been a dramatic increase in the excess
reserves of European banks (Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2010), Pisani-Ferry and Wolff
(2012)), and of U.S. major deposit institutions. Keister and McAndrews (2009), however, point out
that a substantial part of the increase could be due to factors other than hoarding.
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opportunistic sale.17 A large body of literature studies the impact of divesti-
ture on firm performance. Some papers study the motives for selling (Hite,
Owers, and Rogers (1987), John and Ofek (1995), and Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz
(1995), for example) but, to the best of my knowledge, the interaction between
alleged selling motives and adverse selection has been rather overlooked. If
such communication arises more often when the assets for sale are prone to ad-
verse selection, and/or is associated with smaller lemons discounts, this would
provide support for the model.
The model also delivers predictions related to contexts in which the seller’s
cash position is easier to assess by outsiders. The first is the counterpart of
Prediction 3.
PREDICTION 4: Cash-rich firms are relatively more likely to invest in costly
disclosure of information on the quality of the assets they sell (pay certification
fees, for instance) and to report reasons for selling that are allegedly unrelated
to their quality.
When selling assets equally prone to adverse selection, firms with more cash
on hand are indeed more likely to try to alleviate suspicions that their sales
are driven by private information.
Proposition 4 implies that the average quality of sold assets is decreasing
with initial cash holdings. The model therefore predicts that, when buyers
observe large cash holdings held by a seller, they should assign high probability
to the sale being driven by private information, and they should offer a low
price. Accordingly:
PREDICTION 5: Cash-rich firms are likely to face relatively larger lemons dis-
counts.
Empirical studies on the relationship between cash positions and lemons dis-
counts are scarce. However, Gao (2011) finds empirical evidence for an adverse
selection effect of corporate cash reserves in the context of acquisitions that
are financed by stocks. In particular, he finds that announcement returns are
lower for bidders with higher excess cash reserves, which is consistent with my
prediction.
If they face larger lemons discounts, cash-rich firms should be more reluctant
to sell information-sensitive assets. Hence:
PREDICTION 6: Cash-rich firms are relatively less likely to sell assets that are
prone to adverse selection.
This prediction has to be contrasted with the prediction of Myers and Majluf
(1984) that larger financial slack makes a firm more likely to issue equity.
The difference comes mostly from their assumption of a fixed-size investment
opportunity. In their paper, more financial slack means that less capital needs
to be raised to seize the opportunity. Since the net present value of the project
17 After all, as pointed out by Tirole (2011), this is not so different from having ads for used cars
or houses mentioning exogenous reasons for selling (move abroad, family extension, etc.).
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is constant, the marginal return to raising capital is increasing in financial
slack. In my model, in contrast, the marginal utility of cash obtained from the
sale decreases with the cash that was already available.
E. Key Features of the Model
This paper makes the point that holding cash can impose a negative exter-
nality as it worsens adverse selection in markets for long-term assets. While
the point is made in the context of a simple and very stylized model, it applies
quite generally to contexts where cash positions are not easily observable. In
these cases, one should expect it to be relevant in most situations in which both
private information and a need to raise cash are potential motives for selling
assets.
If cash positions were observable in the model, an increase in an agent’s cash
holdingswould still decrease the average quality of his future sale butwould not
impose an externality on others because the market perception of the agent’s
trading motive could be based on his own cash position. The combination of
the two motives for selling is the other key feature of the model. Individually,
these motives are of course quite common. To illustrate that they do not hinge
on very specific assumptions, I identify where they come from in the model and
I provide examples of alternate relevant situations.
First, to have private information as a potential selling motive, I simply as-
sume that agents privately observe their project quality at the beginning of
date 1, and I rule out contracts that would make private information irrelevant
at that date. The underlying specific restrictions are not important. What mat-
ters is that sellers have relevant private information when the market opens.
Holmstro¨m and Tirole (2011) confirm this in a version of the model where
agents can trade at date 0 but are already privately informed.
Second, the potential need to raise cash comes, in the model, from agents
deriving utility from date-1 consumption. Any other reasons cash would be
valuable at date 1 (an investment opportunity or a refinancing need, for in-
stance) would also yield such a selling motive.
Finally, note that it is essential that holding more cash attenuates the need
for cash. It may seem trivial, but cash needs should be endogenous. This is
usually not the case in models that, in the tradition of Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), assume that a fraction of agents are hit by a shock that gives them
an absolute preference for cash.18 By contrast, in my model the decreasing
marginal utility of date-1 consumption ensures that the need to raise cash
decreases with cash holdings. This would also be the case if the need for cash
came from an (possibly random) investment opportunity with a concave return
function (with some strict concavity), but not in the case of an investment
18 This special case usually yields corner solutions for sale decisions, in which case the severity
of adverse selection is likely to be uniquely determined by the fraction of agents hit by the shock.
See Parlour and Plantin (2008) for an example.
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opportunity with linear return and infinite possible scale (as is sometimes
implicitly assumed in the security design literature).19
IV. Conclusion
I present a model in which holding cash imposes a negative externality. This
model sheds light on a new channel through which hoarding behavior may
impair the efficient allocation of resources.
By and large, the results contrast with those of the cash-in-the-market/fire-
sale literature, in which liquidity holding imposes a positive externality.
Whether private agents tend to hold too much or too little liquidity thus de-
pends on the nature of the underlying friction, that is, whether there is an
adverse selection or moral hazard problem. The respective policy implications
are opposite. In particular, my model suggests that imposing liquidity require-
ments on financial institutions, a policy that mitigates fire-sale externalities,
is likely to have adverse unintended consequences in markets prone to adverse
selection.
The regulatory response to the recent crisis suggests that fire sales are indeed
seen as most relevant. However, given the current amount of excess reserves of
financial institutions in Europe and in the United States, it is difficult to argue
that private agents always tend to hold too little liquidity and that hoarding
behavior is only a remote theoretical possibility. Regulators should therefore
not overlook the mechanism highlighted in this paper.
Initial submission: August 15, 2011; Final version received: April 20, 2013
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
(i) The case in which p > 1 is trivial as holding cash is a dominated means
of transfering resources to dates 1 and 2. Thus, y(p) |p>1= 1.
(ii) When p = 1, holding cash is equivalent to investing and then selling,
and it is straightforward to show that the optimal contingent consump-
tion plan corresponds to c2H = RH2 and c1H = c1L = c2L = 12 . This plan is
feasible if and only if y ∈ [ 12 ,1].
(iii) Consider now p < 1. From equation (4), I have UL(p < 1, y) =
2 ln(1+y(p−1)2 ) and, from equation (5),
19 See DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), for instance.
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UH(p < 1, y) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
2 ln
(
1+y(RH−1)
2
)
; y ≤ 11+RH
ln(1 − y) + ln(yRH) ; 11+RH ≤ y ≤ 11+p
ln
(
1+y(p−1)
2
)
+ ln
(
1+y(p−1)
2
(
RH
p
))
; 11+p ≤ y .
(A1)
Letting U
′
i ≡ [ ∂U0∂y |i] be the marginal utility of y conditional on being in state i,
I have U
′
L < 0,∀y, and U
′
H  0 if y  12 . Therefore (1 − π )U
′
L + πU
′
L is always
strictly negative for all y ≥ 12 . Hence, it can only be null for a y ∈ [0, 12 [, and it
must be the case that y(p) |p<1< 12 . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: I seek to establish that ∂t(p,y)
∂y > 0, ∀y ∈ [ 11+p,1] and
p ∈ [RL, pliq], where pliq ≡ RL + π2−π (RH − RL) is the price at the high-liquidity
equilibrium.
When y ≥ 11+p , from equation (5) I have
∂t(p, y)
∂y
= π (RH − p)
(
p+ 1
2p
)
+ (1 − π )(RL − p).
First, note that ∂t(p,y)
∂y is decreasing in p. I can therefore focus on p = pliq
since it is the most unfavorable case. Since buyers break even on expectation at
equilibrium, I have t(pliq,1) = 0. But, when y = 11+pliq , I have xH(pliq, 11+pliq ) = 0.
This implies that t(pliq, 11+pliq ) =
(1−π)(RL−pliq)
1+pliq < 0. Since
1
1+pliq < 1, and
∂t(p,y)
∂y does
not depend on y, it must therefore be the case that ∂t(p,y)
∂y > 0, ∀y ∈ [ 11+pliq ,1],
which establishes the result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: First, define p
′
(p, ρ) ≡ RL + q(p, y(p, ρ))[RH − RL], the
implied price correspondence for a given ρ.
Let p
′′
(ρ) denote the largest fixed point that solves p
′
(p, ρ) = p. The first
step of the proof is to show that, if this fixed point p
′′
(ρ) exists, it is strictly
decreasing in ρ, for p > 1.
A direct adaptation of Proposition 1 (optimal investment) shows that con-
straint (9) is binding when p > 1. Hence, at the optimal investment level,
xH(p, y) = xH(p,1 − ρ) = max{0; 1−ρ2 − ρ2p}. Since it is decreasing in ρ, the re-
sulting average quality q(p,1 − ρ) is decreasing in ρ too, and it is easy to check
that it is increasing in p. Therefore, considering ρlow < ρhigh, the price corre-
sponding to the largest fixed point under ρlow (denoted p
′′
(ρlow)) is larger than
the price it would imply under ρhigh, that is, p
′
(p
′′
(ρlow), ρhigh) < p
′′
(ρlow). Hence,
p
′′
(ρlow) cannot be a fixed point under ρhigh. Since q(p,1 − ρ) is decreasing in ρ
for any p, and, by definition, p
′′
(ρlow) is the largest fixed point under ρlow, there
cannot exist a fixed point p
′′
(ρhigh) such that p
′′
(ρhigh) ≥ p′′(ρlow).
Next, note that there exists a ρ < 1 such that xH(p
′′
(0),1 − ρ) = 0. Since
p
′′
(ρ) is strictly decreasing for p > 1 and xH(p, y) decreases with p, there exists
a ρ < 1 for which xH(p,1 − ρ) = 0, for any p ≤ p′′ (0), which is inconsistent
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with the existence of a high-liquidity equilibrium. Then, since p
′′
(ρ) is strictly
decreasing for p > 1, there exists a ρˆ such that p
′′
(ρ) = RL, ∀ρ > ρˆ.
Finally, if the high-liquidity equilibrium still exists under the liquidity re-
quirement, that both types of agents are strictly worse off with a liquidity
requirement is a direct consequence of the externality. Since p is lower with
the requirement, agents L, who sell everything, are strictly worse off. Agents H
are strictly worse off too because holding cash wastes resources, which strictly
shrinks their budget set, and because the price of date-1 consumption becomes
higher (since p is lower). Q.E.D.
Appendix B: Lack of Global Strategic Complementarities
In this appendix, I show that increasing cash holdings when they are already
high presents strategic substitutabilities, which I argue precludes the use of
standard equilibrium selection techniques.
A. Strategic Substitutabilities
I show that, when 1 − y ≥ p1+p , increasing cash holdings further increases
the expected transfer and hence the market price. Since an increase in price
decreases incentives to increase cash holdings, this establishes the strategic
substitutabilities.
Since 1 − y ≥ p1+p corresponds to y < 11+p , this implies that xH(p, y) = 0. In
that case,
∂t(p, y)
∂y
= (1 − π )(RL − p) ≤ 0 .
There are two relevant cases to consider: either p = RL (which is the case at
the low-liquidity equilibrium) or p > RL (which is the case at the high-liquidity
equilibrium but can also happen out of equilibrium).
The interesting case is the latter, because ∂t(p,y)
∂y < 0 implies that an increase
in cash holdings (a decrease in y) imposes a positive pecuniary externality. An
agent who increases cash holdings decreases the quantity of long-term assets
that he invests in. If these turn out to be good, he does not sell them (because
y < 11+p); if they turn out to be lemons, he sells them. But the quantity of lemons
he sells has decreased. Thus, the expected transfer increases (it is negative but
decreases in absolute value). This establishes the strategic substitutabilities.
When p = RL, there are only lemons in the market, and an increase in cash
holdings does not affect the price.
B. Implications for Equilibrium Selection
In games of strategic complementarities, while multiple equilibria are typi-
cal, they are generally not robust to a slight departure from the assumption that
agents share a common knowledge of the economic environment. For instance,
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under global strategic complementarities one can generally use equilibrium
selection techniques based on the iterative deletion of dominated strategies,
such as global games (Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Frankel, Morris, and
Pauzner (2003), Morris and Shin (2004), Vives (2005)). When they concern
actions that are outside the relevant range of possible actions, the presence
of strategic substitutabilities does not preclude equilibrium uniqueness under
incomplete information (Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), Mason and Valentinyi
(2010), Bueno de Mesquita (2011)). However, the strategic substitutabilities
present in my model concern the relevant range of action. Technically, it can be
shown that they imply that best responses to monotonic strategies are not al-
ways monotonic, which rules out the single-crossing conditions for uniqueness
exploited in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), Mason and Valentinyi (2010), and
Bueno de Mesquita (2011).
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